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SALES- THE EFFECT OF THE UNIFORM SALES ACT
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF STANDING TIMBER
The rights of a grantee of a deed conveying standing timber have
been the subject of much litigation.1 Whenever and wherever the
problem has arisen, it has resulted in a great deal of confusion so
that many jurisdictions have developed their own peculiar rules. Any
attempt to reconcile these views would be a hopeless task. Even an
effort to state with certainty or to show a logical evolution of the
present law in one jurisdiction would be met with quite a bit of diffi-
culty since courts have frequently reversed or qualified previous rul-
ings. Thus it can be seen that any statutory enactment which would
help to clarify and unify these rules would be very desirable. Recently,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court may have indicated that such a statute
was now in effect in Wisconsin when it rather summarily stated:
".... that the Uniform Sales Act has changed the law in
Wisconsin so that industrial growing crops, growing trees, and
other nursery stock 'attached to or forming a part of the land
which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract
of sale' are to be considered 'goods' and are consequently per-
sonal property." 2
The purpose of this comment is to attempt to determine what
effect the Sales Act should have upon a contract to sell standing tim-
ber and what effect was given it in the Jens Case. Before doing this,
it will be necessary to point out the various common law rules which
have been applied to the "timber cases" throughout the United States
and to set forth with as much certainty as possible the common law
in Wisconsin.
COMMON LAw RULES THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES
All states will agree that growing trees are realty and by being cut
they are converted into personalty, but there is a sharp division of
authority as to the status of growing trees which have been contracted
to be sold.3 A majority of the states look to the inherent nature of the
subject matter as things permanently attached to the land and con-
sider them as realty until they have been cut.4 On the other hand there
is a strong minority view, advanced by such states as Texas, Kentucky,
Pennsylvania, and Maryland, holding that where the contract of sale
contemplates immediate severance of the trees, they will be considered
I See Notes 15 A.L.R. 41; 31 A.L.R. 944; 42 A.L.R. 641; 71 A.L.R. 143; 164
A.L.R. 423.
2 Jens v. Habeck, 259 Wis. 338, 48 N.W. 2d 473 (1951).
350 C. J. PROPERTY §45.
4Hirth v. Graham, 50 Ohio St. 57, 33 N.E. 90 (1893).
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personalty from the date of the contract.5 The basis of this rule is
apparently the equitable doctrine that that which was intended to be
done will be considered as having been done. The intent of the par-
ties to such a contract is clearly that the trees be treated as personalty.
Therefore it would seem that the minority is logically the sounder
view and the trend has been in that direction. 6
Generally the law of the "timber cases" is concerned with two main
problems; when no time is stated for removal of the trees, is a fee
absolute in the trees granted or must they be removed within a reason-
able time; and what is the effect of a failure to remove the trees
within the time fixed for removal on the rights of the grantee.
On the problem of the time for removal, the intent of the parties
is held to govern. As a general rule a reasonable time is allowed and
a grant in perpetuity will not be implied unless such can be clearly
seen to have been the intention of the parties.7 The wording in deeds
construed as conveying a fee in the trees has usually been of two types,
one in which the right is given to cut the timber which may at any-
time grow on a certain piece of land, and the other granting a right
forever to cut the timber standing at the time of the grant in which
case certain trees are often specified." If an immediate severance of
the trees is indicated by the contract only a reasonable time is allowed
for removal when no time is stated.9 What is a reasonable time depends
on the circumstances attending the making of the contract, and the
location, nature, accessibility, and uses of the land and the timber.10
Some states have adopted special rules which vary the requirement as
to a reasonable time. In Louisiana the time must be fixed by the court
on petition of the landowner and the grantee's rights are not forfeited
until such time expires." Other states have imposed the requirement
of notice to the grantee either before the reasonable time starts to
run or before it is terminated.. 2 Wisconsin, in the case of reservations,
has distinguished between a reservation of the timber and one of
merely the right to cut, calling the former an exception and the latter
5 Supra, note 3.
6 Scott, Specific Performance of a Contract to Sell Standing Timber for Im-
mediate Severance, 17 KEN. L. J. 48 (1928).7 Supra, note 1.8 New River Lumber Co. v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co., 146 Tenn. 181, 240 S.W.
763 (1922).
9 Davis v. Conn. 161 S.W. 39 (Tex. 1913).
10 Wilson Cypress Co. v. Stevens, 106 Fla. 717, 143 So. 661 (1932).
" Simmons v. Tremont Lumber Co., 144 La. 719, 81 So. 263 (1919).
2 Greg v. Berdsall, 53 Barb. (N.Y.) 402 (18663; Patterson v. Graham, 164 Pa.




a reservation of a mere license requiring a reasonable time for
removal.
1 3
The question of the rights of the purchaser after the time for re-
moval has expired has been dealt with quite frequently by the courts.
It is by far the majority rule that both the license and the right to
the timber are lost by the expiration of the time.14 One of two reasons
is usually given for the rule, either that a defeasible fee in the timber
was granted or that the grantee got merely a license to enter and cut,
and on cutting, title was obtained. Many courts have used both rea-
sons at different times with much confusion resulting. 15
The minority rule followed in only a few jurisdictions is that the
license is lost but not the right to the timber. This results in the un-
fortunate situation of the grantee owning the timber but having no
right to remove it, and is apparently due to the reluctance of some
courts to decree a forfeiture. For example, California courts will use
this rule if they determine that the parties did not intend that there
should be a forfeiture,1 6 Indiana has said that title is not lost in the
absence of a forfeiture clause,17 and Pennsylvania has held that where
no time for removal is fixed and a reasonable time expires, no for-
feiture results and only the license is lost. ' s
Another problem which sometimes arises is whether timber cut but
not removed within the time fixed reverts. Since almost all courts
will agree that after the timber is cut, it is the personal property of
the grantee, it is generally held that title to such timber does not revert."9
Some courts then allow a reasonable time for removal after the period
specified while others hold the property is unlawfully on the land of
the grantee.20 Even courts which hold that title to such timber reverts
ordinarily will not apply the rule when the timber has been manufac-
tured to some extent.2
13 Bardon v. O'Brien, 140 Wis. 191, 120 N.W. 827 (1909) ; Williams v. Jones, 131
Wis. 361, 111 N.W. 505 (1907); Martin v. Gilson, 37 Wis. 360 (1875); Rich
v. Zielsdorf, 22 Wis. 544 (1868).
14 Supra, note 1.
15 Cownzpare Ackley v. Elliot, 198 App. Div. 965, 190 N.Y. Supp. 56 (1921) with
Nichols v. Lane, 192 N.Y. Supp. 362 (1922) ; compare Lancaster v. Roth, 155
S.W. 597 (Tex. 1913) with Davis v. Conn, 161 S.W. 39 (Tex. 1913).
16 Anderson v. Palladine, 37 Cal. App. 256, 178 Pac. 553 (1919).
'-Advance Veneer & Lumber Co. v. Hornaday, 49 Ind. App. 83, 96 N.E. 784
(1911).
Is Saltonsall v. Little, 90 Pa. 422, 35 Am. Rep. 683 (1879).
19 Clark v. Aldrich, 278 Fed. 941 (Ist Cir. 1922).
20 Osborne v. Eldridge, 130 Or. 385, 280 Pac. 497 (1929). Contra: Erskine v.
Savage, 96 Me. 57, 51 Atl. 242 (1901).
21 Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga. 327, 50 S.E. 135 (1905) ; Butler v. McPherson, 95
Miss. 635, 49 So. 257 (1909) ; Hubbard v. Burton, 75 Mo. 65 (1881) ; Mahan v.
Clark, 219 Pa. 229, 68 Atl. 667 (1908).
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THE LAW OF THE "TIMBER CASES" IN WISCONSIN
The Wisconsin court has held many times that standing timber
under a contract of sale is an interest in realty. One of the early cases
and the one which is generally referred to as settling the question for
Wisconsin is Daniels v. Bailey.2 2 There an oral contract was made for
the sale of timber to be removed during the two ensuing winters. The
plaintiff claimed that since immediate severance was contemplated the
contract was for the sale of personal property and was valid. But the
court held that although an immediate severance was intended, the
timber by its nature was an interest in land and the contract was unen-
forceable. The sole departure from this rule was made in the case of
Cadle v. McLean2 3 in which it was held that a sale of timber under
a conditional sales agreement was a sale of personalty to take effect
as and when the timber was cut. However five years later in Lillie v.
Dunbar 2 4 the court went back to the rule of the Bailey Case and ex-
pressly overruled Cadle v. McLean and this case has been continually
followed.
Wisconsin has also frequently followed one of its earliest cases on
the rights of the purchaser after the time for removal has expired,
Strasson v. Montgomery.25 In that case it was held that only so much
timber was conveyed as the grantee could remove within the time
stated for removal. The deed, itself, granted a mere license and title
to the trees was obtained by cutting and removing them. However in
a few cases, the court has called the grantee's interest a defeasible
interest in realty and more than a mere license.2 6 Still in either case
when the time for removal had run, all rights of the grantee were ter-
minated. In Golden v. Glock 1 7 the court further held that although the
deed conveyed only the timber which could be removed within the
time stated, the manufacture of the trees into stave bolts so essentially
changed their character as to constitute a constructive removal. Hence
the stave bolts remaining on the land did not revert and the grantee
had an implied license to remove them. Still later in Hicks v. Smith, 
2 8
the court went a step farther and held that ordinary timber left lying
on the land after the license had expired did not revert since the mere
cutting converted it into the personal property of the grantee and he
could go on the land to remove it for a reasonable time afterwards.
2243 Wis. 566 (1878).
2348 Wis. 630 (1880).
2462 Wis. 198, 22 N.W. 467 (1885).
2532 Wis. 52 (1873).
26 Kneeland-McLurg L. Co. v. Lillie, 156 Wis. 428, 145 N.W. 1093 (1914);
Schmidt v. Almon, 181 Wis. 244, 194 N.W. 168 (1923).
2T57 Wis. 118, 15 N.W. 12, 46 Am. Rep. 32 (1883).
28 77 Wis. 146, 46 N.W. 133 (1890).
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Thus it can be seen that Wisconsin has avoided much of the con-
fusion prevalent in other states by rather consistently following its
early decisions on this subject and consequently a fairly well defined
body of law has been derived.
THE EFFECT GIVEN THE UNIFORM SALES AcT IN THE JENS CASE
The Jens Case19 concerned the rights of a purchaser of nursery
stock who had failed to remove it within the time given for removal.
The court held that the law of the "timber cases," under which the
rights of the purchaser would have clearly expired on the day named
was not applicable because the Uniform Sales Act had changed the law
in Wisconsin. The question which immediately arises is whether the
court in noticing this change made its ruling broad enough to imply a
change in the "timber cases" so that an extension of the rule thereto
can be probably expected. Prior to this case, nursery stock was gen-
erally treated as realty in Wisconsin.3" However, as the court pointed
out, there is also authority holding it to be fructus industriales and
considering it as personal property. The three justices dissenting
called such trees an industrial growing crop under the Act rather than
bringing them within the phrase "things attached to and forming a part
of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the
contract of sale." But the majority did not base its ruling upon such
a classification. Both phrases were used and growing trees were men-
tioned separately so as to apparently include all growing trees rather
than saying "industrial growing crops, and growing trees and other
nursery stock." Hence the court's ruling is apparently broad enough
to be applied to the "timber cases." Thus an examination of other
authorities to determine the effect which has been given the Sales Act
in this respect becomes relevant.
The English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, was a forerunner of the
Uniform Sales Act in the United States. The English common law
on the nature of standing timber under a contract of sale before the
passage of their Act was based on the case of Marchall v. Green.31
That case concerned an oral contract for the sale of thirty-two trees to
be taken away as soon as possible. The court held that the contract
was enforceable because it was for the sale of personalty and it had
been partially performed. In so ruling the court distinguished between
cases where the trees were intended to remain in the land and derive
a benefit therefrom, and those where an immediate severance was con-
templated saying:
29 Supra, note 2.
30 Note, 1 Wis. L. R. 170 (1921).
31 1C.P.D. 35 (1875).
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"Where the thing sold is to derive no benefit from the land
and it is to be taken away immediately, the contract is not for
an interest in land."
The Uniform Sales Act was patterned after the English Sale of
Goods Act and copies therefrom the definition of "goods."
"Goods include all chattels personal other than things in
action and money. The term includes emblements, industrial
growing crops, and things attached to and forming a part of the
land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the
contract of sale."
The intention of the Act was not to revise or reform the then existing
law governing the sale of goods but rather to restate it.32 Therefore as
Williston suggests the Act copying as it has the English Act must
have intended to adopt the English common law rule as laid down in
Marshall v. Green.33 Hence it becomes significant to examine English
cases on the status of standing timber under a contract of sale since
the passage of the English Act to see what effect has been given it.
Unfortunately there is an apparent scarcity of reported English cases
directly bearing on this point. However one such case has been dis-
cussed a few times.34 This case concerned an oral contract to pur-
chase timber for immediate severance. The grantee had been ousted
before the severance was completed. The court there held that the
grantee's right was different from a mere revocable license such as a
license to enter and shoot but was irrevocable since the grantee had an
interest in the timber before it was cut and they further said:
* . . the effect of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, has now
to be considered. Goods are there defined in such a manner as
to include growing timber which is to be severed under the
contract of sale."
Canada has also adopted a Sale of Goods Act which was patterned
after the English Act and copied the definition of "Goods" therefrom.
Hence Canadian rulings on the effect of their statute are also perti-
nent. In Fredkin v. Clines33 the court made the statement that:
"By this definition ('Goods' under their Act) we are to con-
sider as goods things attached to or forming a part of the land
which are agreed to be severed under the contract of sale .. .
If, therefore, growing trees, or natural grass be sold for the
purpose of being cut and taken away, pursuant to the contract,
they are goods under this definition."
In another case worth mentioning,3 6 the purchaser of the land brought
32 Ford v. Waldorf System Inc., 57 R.I. 13, 188 Atl. 633 (1936).
33 1 WILLISTON ON SALES §62 (2d ed. 1924).
34Jones v. Tankerville, 2 Ch. 440 (1909).
35 18 MAN. L. R. 249 (1909). Bracketed material added.36 Hingley v. Lynds, 44 D.L.R. 743 (1918).
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action for unlawful entry against a prior purchaser of the timber.
With six justices sitting the court was evenly divided, one justice hold-
ing that the contract was either for an interest in land with an irrevo-
cable license or a sale of goods, under the Act; two justices holding
that the Act had changed the law so that a sale of standing trees must
be held to be a sale of goods under the Act in determining the rights
of the parties, and the trees become goods before severance because
they were to be severed under the contract; and the three remaining
justices holding that this contract came under the Act but was merely
a contract to sell and was not to take effect until the trees were cut.
The property in the "goods" could not pass until they came into exist-
ence, that is, until the trees were severed. In this view the purchaser
of the timber had no interest therein until it was cut. The opinion ren-
dered by the two justices in giving more than such limited effect to the
Act seems more logical and can be traced back to the theory of Mar-
shall v. Green.37
American courts have been slow to recognize the effects of the
Uniform Sales Act on these contracts. However some of the leading
textwriters in the United States suggest that the Act should be inter-
preted to have an effect thereon. In the Restatement of Contracts it is
said:
"Under the circumstances stated in Clause (c) (agreed to
be severed before sale or under the contract of sale) even
fructus naturales have been held withdrawn from the operation
of the provision of the statute (State of Frauds) relating to
land."38
In his work on sales Mr. Williston says:
".... the Sales Act copying as it has, the definition of 'goods,'
so far as concerns this question, from the English Statute, has
adopted the English rule that any growing object attached to the
soil is to be treated as goods, if by the terms of the contract it is
to be immediately severed.139
Other American textwriters which seem to follow this view include
Tiffany and Burdick.40
Comments in law review articles have also approved of the change.
In one such article it is said:
"Where the Sales Act has been adopted there certainly
should be no doubt as to the status of such contracts . . . Un-
questionably there is no ambiguity couched in this phrase (the
definition of 'goods' in the Act) and it is hard to see how any
37 Supra, note 31.38 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §200 (1932). Bracketed material added.
39 Supra, note 33.40 BuaRnCK ON SALES 3d ed. pp. 29-30; TIFFANY ON SALEs p. 76.
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court deciding a case involving a sale of timber for immediate
severance could go astray in its interpretation. "41
In most of the cases which have been decided 'ince the adoption
of the Uniform Sales Act throughout the United States, the effect of
the Act has not been put into issue and the courts have based their
rulings on previously decided cases within their jurisdictions. Hence
those courts which have held the right transferred was an interest in
realty have continued to do so, and those following the immediate
severance rule have referred to earlier cases and not to the Act.
4 2
However a few courts have either mentioned its possible effect as
dicta or have partially based their rulings thereon. In Reid v. Kerr 3
the issue was whether the timber was realty or personalty. The court
in a lengthy discussion of the effect of the Act pointed out its source
as the English Act and the case of Marshall v. Green,44 and also the
apparent differences of opinion between various courts since the pas-
sage of the Act, but escaped making a ruling on this point because the
contract there did not necessarily call for a severance of the trees at
all. In another case,45 involving an oral contract to purchase standing
timber to be removed within two years, all parties and the court ap-
parently went on the assumption that the trees before being cut were
personal property because the only issue was whether a check was
received in part payment to satisfy the requirements of the Statute of
Frauds. In still another case46 decided in 1948 involving the validity
of an oral contract for the sale and immediate removal of standing
timber, the court referred to authorities which have recognized a
change due to the Act such as Williston on Contracts 47 and the Re-
statement of Contracts"' and also to others which have failed to do so,
and concludes by saying:
"We will not further pursue this quest. We conclude that
the sale was that of personal property, and not within the
Statute of Frauds."
Therefore while American courts have been slow to recognize the
changes made by the Act, they have begun to do so and a gradual
accession to this view can probably be expected.
41Supra, note 6. Bracketed material added. See, 6 CORNELL L. Q. 426 (1921).42 Considered as realty: Elmonte Inv. Co. v. Shaefer Bros. Logging Co., 192
Wash. 1, 72 P. 2d 311 (1937); Steller v. Thomas, 232 Minn. 275, 45 N.W. 2d
537 (1950); New River Lumber Co. v. Blue Ridge Lumber Co., 146 Tenn.
181, 240 S.W. 763 (1922). Considered as personality: Patton v. Lucy, 285 Ky.
694, 148 S.W. 2d 1039 (1941) ; Seabolt v. Christian, 82 Ga. App. 167, 60 S.E. 2d
540 (1950).
43 175 Ore. 192, 152 P. 2d 417 (1944).
44 Supra, note 31.
45 Dutton v. Bennett. 256 Mass. 397, 152 N.E. 621 (1926).46 Rankin v. Ridge, 53 N.M. 33. 201 P. 2d 359 (1948).
4 2WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §516 (Rev. ed. 1936).
48 Supra, note 38.
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Since the passage of the Act in Wisconsin, the Supreme Court
has referred to standing trees under a contract of sale as constituting
an interest in realty in a couple of cases in which this point was not
directly brought into issue. In one case the court ruled that the trees
were taxable to the landowner rather than the purchaser since all the
purchaser got was a defeasible interest, and in the other that the
purchaser was more than a mere licensee and could maintain an action
of trespass." In both cases the status of the trees as realty was not
contested and the court summarily called them realty by referring to
Lillie v. Dunbar" and other cases of long standing. The case which
generally has been held to set forth the Wisconsin viewpoint is Schaap
v. Wolf,5 decided ten years after the adoption of the Sales Act in
Wisconsin. That case concerned a written contract for the immediate
severance of timber which was orally agreed to be extended over an-
other year. In their decision the court referred to such old cases as
Daniels v. Bailey52 and said:
"That a contract for the sale of standing timber relates to
an interest in land and comes within the Statutes of Frauds is
well settled in this state."
This case is often mentioned in discussions of this point. In Reid v.
Kerr- the Oregon Court said that although the Sales Act was not men-
tioned in the Wolf Case such an erudite court as Wisconsin's must
have realized the effect of the Act and considered it inapplicable.
However it must be pointed out that the grantee of the deed did not
contest this point but rather relied on the contention that the oral
agreement was but an extension of the time of performance and the
grantor was estopped from setting up the Statute as a defense. Hence
this case involved no lengthy discussion of the point and is not as
strong as some would make it out to be. Furthermore it has not es-
caped criticism from those who believe such a ruling destroys the
obvious intent of the Sales Act."r Thus it can be seen that since this
question was not directly brought into issue in the Wolf Case and the
court held that the law was well settled by the early cases on this sub-
ject, it is possible that they did not appreciate the significance of the
Sales Act. It was not until three years later that Williston made note
of the apparent change brought about.5 5 His view seems more logical
in that it gives effect to the apparent intent of the parties. Wisconsin
has followed an intention theory in a subsequent case involving a con-
4 Supra, note 26.
50 Supra, note 24.
51 173 Wis. 351, 181 N.W. 214 (1921).
52Supra, note 22.
5 Supra, note 43.
54 CORNELLL. Q. 426 (1921).
55 Supra. note 33.
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tract for the sale and removal of machinery attached to the land,5"
and there is apparently no reason why this idea could not be applied in
the case of timber. Hence it is probable that the court may have
changed its attitude since its ruling in the Wolf Case thirty years ago.
THE EFFECT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM SALES ACT TO
THE TIMBER CASES
As stated previously the Uniform Sales Act being based ultimately
on the rule of Marshall v. Green adopted an immediate severance rule
similar to that used in some of the states. The Act itself indicates no
necessity for an immediate severance so long as a severance is contem-
plated some time or other. Hence Williston and other writers at first
did not think this was necessary.5 7 However in his latest word on
sales Williston holds that in the light of the origin of the Act, it must
be implied that an immediate severance is necessary.58 Since the Act
incorporates this rule in states following it as a part of their common
law, no change would be made. However in the majority of states,
including Wisconsin, the "timber cases" would be overruled in that a
contract contemplating an immediate severance would be held to take
effect as a sale of personal property. Some authorities which have
recognized the immediate severance rule have given it only a limited
effect in holding that the sale does not take place until the trees are
cut and in order to effectuate a valid conveyance before then the in-
strument must be in writing and executed with the formalities neces-
sary to transfer an interest in land.59 However this is not the true
rule as laid down by Marshall v Green and adopted by the Sales Act.
Under this rule Section 4 of the Sales Act should govern rather than
the section of the Statute of Frauds relating to realty.
60
"This contract is unconditional. It is for the sale of specific
goods, namely all the cullings on the lot. The goods were in a
deliverable state, that is to say, there was nothing to be done by
the seller to put them in a deliverable state; the purchaser was
to go and get them. I think the title to the trees passed to the
defendant when the contract was made."'61
Furthermore, the rights of the grantee would probably be held to be
terminated upon failure to remove the trees within the time specified
since courts following the immediate severance rule have generally
taken the view that the extent of the grant is limited to the agreed
56 Boscobel v. Muscada Mfg. Co., 175 Wis. 62, 183 N.W. 963 (1921).
57 Supra, note 54.
5SNote change made in I WILLISTON ON SALES §62 (Rev. ed. 1948).
592 TIFFANY, ON REAL PROPERTY, §596 (3d ed. 1939).
60 Void, The Application of the Statute of Frauds under the Uniform Sales Act,
15 MINN. L. R. 391, 398 (1931).
61 Supra, note 36.
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time and determined thereby.62 Thus in Wisconsin the practical change
effected in this respect would be slight since Wisconsin has always
held that the rights of the grantee did not extend beyond the time
fixed whether the reasoning therefor was based on a determinable fee
doctrine or the rule that only a license was granted. Furthermore the
rule of Hicks v Smith3 would survive because it was based on the
ruling that the cut timber was the personal property of the purchaser.
Many other changes would be made such as the enforceability of
oral warrantees of title, implied warrantees, and specific performance
of the contract which are beyond the scope of this comment.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion it must be stated that the court in the lens Case
clearly did not rule that the "timber cases" were overruled by the Sales
Act but rather found that the law of these cases was not applicable to
nursery stock since this came under the Act either as something at-
tached to the soil which was agreed to be severed under the contract
of sale or as an industrial growing crop. However it is not too im-
probable that the court, if it had been called upon to make such a
ruling, would have done so since leading textwriters in the United
States consider the Act as being applicable and courts in England,
Canada, and the United States have ruled that their Sales Acts are
controlling. Furthermore it must be noted that the Wisconsin Court
has established a reputation for keeping abreast of most changes in
judicial thought and also that it has frequently considered Williston
to be a weighty authority. Therefore by expressly mentioning grow-
ing trees within its ruling the court may well have laid the stepping
stone by which it can cross over the "timber cases" to a new and
more logical position.
JOHN M. GRoGA
62 Supra, note 9.6s Supra, note 28.
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